Industrial Apocalyptic: Neoliberalism, Coal, and the Burlesque Frame by Peeples, Jennifer et al.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Communication Studies Faculty Publications Communication Studies 
Summer 2014 
Industrial Apocalyptic: Neoliberalism, Coal, and the Burlesque 
Frame 
Jennifer Peeples 
Pete Bsumek 
Steven J. Schwarze 
University of Montana - Missoula, steven.schwarze@umontana.edu 
Jen Schneider 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/communications_pubs 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Peeples, Jennifer; Bsumek, Pete; Schwarze, Steven J.; and Schneider, Jen, "Industrial Apocalyptic: 
Neoliberalism, Coal, and the Burlesque Frame" (2014). Communication Studies Faculty Publications. 14. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/communications_pubs/14 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Communication Studies at ScholarWorks at University 
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Communication Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Industrial Apocalyptic 1 
 
 
INDUSTRIAL APOCALYPTIC: NEOLIBERALISM, COAL, AND THE BURLESQUE FRAME 
JENNIFER PEEPLES, PETE BSUMEK, STEVE SCHWARZE, AND JEN SCHNEIDER 
<ABSTRACT>Rhetorical scholarship and cultural commentary has demonstrated that 
environmentalist voices are consistently associated with apocalyptic rhetoric.  However, this 
association deflects attention from the apocalyptic rhetoric that comes from industry and 
countermovements to environmentalism. This essay seeks to remedy that oversight by proposing 
the concept of “industrial apocalyptic” as a significant rhetorical form in environmental 
controversy. Based on analysis of the rhetoric of the US coal industry, we find that these 
industrial apocalyptic narratives rely on a burlesque frame in order to disrupt the categories of 
establishment and outsider, and thus thwart environmental regulation. Ultimately, we argue that 
industrial apocalyptic co-opts environmentalist appeals for radical change in the service of 
blocking such change and naturalizes neoliberal ideology as the common-sense discourse of the 
center.</ABSTRACT> 
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For every concern, I’d invent a crisis; and for every crisis, I’d invent the cause. 
--Free Market America, “If I Wanted America to Fail” 1 
In the realm of environmental controversy in the United States, apocalyptic rhetoric is 
consistently associated with environmentalist voices. Examples of such labeling abound: an 
editorial in the Investor’s Business Daily discussing clean air concludes, “Meanwhile, green 
groups froth with apocalyptic rhetoric.”2 Describing a case of ecotage, the editor of the 
Richmond Times Dispatch claims, “It is mildly tempting to blame mainstream environmentalists, 
with their sometimes apocalyptic rhetoric, for fostering an atmosphere upon which the lunatic 
fringe feeds.”3 And in a piece provocatively titled “No reason to fear the environmental 
bogeyman,” Ben Eisen contends, “For decades, the more radical elements of the modern 
environmental movement have employed terrifying, apocalyptic rhetoric in an effort to scare 
citizens and policymakers into enacting an agenda that can go beyond common sense 
environmental policies.”4   
But the easy association of environmentalism with apocalyptic rhetoric is inaccurate and 
politically misleading. When mass media identify environmentalism as apocalyptic, they mark 
environmentalism as radical, outside the mainstream, and unreasonable, which clears a space for 
Industrial Apocalyptic 3 
 
industry voices to be perceived as the rational center, the common sense approach to 
environmental issues.5 This association also deflects attention from the apocalyptic rhetoric that 
comes from industry. In his history of environmental politics, Samuel Hays problematizes the 
association of environmental discourse with the apocalypse, claiming that historically, 
"environmentalists were the purveyors of optimism about the possibilities of human achievement 
while administrative and technical leaders were the constant bearers of bad news. In the media 
the roles were reversed: Environmentalists warned of impending catastrophe, while the technical 
leadership exuded optimism.” 6 
Rhetorical scholars who continue to identify apocalyptic rhetoric with environmentalism 
reinforce this distorted perception of the rhetoric of environmental controversies—a move that 
unnecessarily limits our understanding of apocalyptic rhetoric. For example, although M. Jimmie 
Killingsworth and Jacqueline Palmer acknowledge that “the enemies of environmentalism have 
regularly devised apocalyptic narratives of their own,”7 they also identify apocalyptic narrative as 
“a standard feature of environmentalist polemic”8 and focus primarily on environmentalist voices 
while giving brief attention to only two examples of apocalyptic rhetoric from opponents of 
environmentalism: Monsanto’s rejoinder to Silent Spring titled The Desolate Year, and the 
rhetoric of former Interior Secretary James Watt.9  More recently, Christina R. Foust and William 
O. Murphy analyze apocalyptic framing in US press coverage of climate change, yet those 
frames are almost exclusively built from quotations of pro-environmental sources.10  In our view, 
the scholarly and public focus on environmentalist uses of apocalyptic discourse has deflected 
attention away from the structure and function of apocalyptic rhetoric used by 
countermovements to environmentalism.  
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This essay seeks to remedy that oversight. We propose the concept of industrial 
apocalyptic as a significant rhetorical form in environmental controversy, using texts in support 
of the US coal industry as our examples. We define industrial apocalyptic as narratives that 
constitute the imminent demise of a particular industry or a broader economic system for the 
purpose of influencing public opinion and public policy. This form of apocalyptic is consistent 
with the secular apocalyptic that Kurt Ritter and David Henry identify in the conservative 
rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, a rhetoric that, in James Arnt Aune’s view, consistently seeks to 
manage the ideological tensions between free market capitalism and patriotism.11  We find that 
the industrial apocalyptic rhetoric used on behalf of the coal industry relies on a burlesque frame 
to disrupt the categories of establishment and outsider and to thwart environmental regulation.12 
Ultimately, the industrial apocalyptic co-opts environmentalist appeals for radical change in the 
service of blocking such change and naturalizes neoliberal ideology as the common-sense 
discourse of the center.  
The essay proceeds by first reviewing scholarship on apocalyptic rhetoric and the 
burlesque frame to establish our theoretical framework. Then, it justifies our focus on the 
rhetoric supporting the coal industry before analyzing the apocalyptic and burlesque dimensions 
of that rhetoric. The latter portion of the essay draws out several implications that advance our 
understanding of those concepts as well as the role that industrial apocalyptic rhetoric plays in 
articulating neoliberal hegemony. 
Theorizing Apocalyptic Rhetoric 
Apocalyptic rhetoric is a recurring feature of American public discourse that has drawn 
the attention of many rhetorical scholars.13 Foust and Murphy define apocalyptic rhetoric as 
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having “a linear temporality emphasizing a catastrophic end-point that is more or less outside the 
purview of human agency,” with stronger versions exhibiting a “persistent placement of ‘natural’ 
events as catastrophic, inevitable, and outside of ‘human’ control.”14 Apocalyptic rhetoric 
functions as a predictive discourse which aids the audience in understanding the past, present, 
and future,15 and as an ideological discourse in which the narrator promotes a “change in 
consciousness or political agenda” that is as extreme as the predicted catastrophe.16 Scholars 
have noted that apocalyptic rhetoric in particular has enjoyed a resurgence in popularity in 
contemporary times, in and beyond environmental discourse.17  Apocalyptic appeals are an 
increasingly pervasive cultural phenomenon, perhaps brought on by “millennial apocalypticism,” 
or the widespread sense that the turn of the century would be marked by apocalyptic change.18  
We see this as additional evidence that attributing apocalyptic appeals solely to 
environmentalists is itself a rhetorical move, one that deflects attention from industrial 
apocalyptic rhetoric.  
Environmentalist versions of apocalyptic rhetoric have garnered mostly unfavorable 
attention precisely because they challenge one of the primary touchstones of US culture: 
progress.19 The impacts of economic and industrial progress became a concern in the 1950s as 
people began to see the environmental downsides of advances that had been touted as life-
improving.20  In the following decade, Rachel Carson’s 1962 book Silent Spring and Paul R. 
Ehrlich’s 1968 The Population Bomb were widely read, popular books which narrated a dark 
future if people did not control the use of pesticides and human reproduction, with Ehrlich 
causing considerable controversy with his dire claims that it was already too late to prevent a 
substantial increase in the world death rate.21  Climate change has reawakened overt public 
questioning of progress, although Killingsworth and Palmer maintain that the public response to 
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climate change has produced a weaker version of apocalyptic rhetoric—not the imminent 
collapse of human society with no means of intervention, but one that allows behavioral changes 
to help mitigate the effects of global warming.22  
Scholars with an interest in environmentalist apocalyptic also have attempted to theorize 
the effects of apocalyptic rhetoric on environmental action.  They query, does apocalyptic 
rhetoric effectively engage an audience and create a sense of environmental identity or 
responsibility?23  Or does it backfire, generating fear and alienating the audience into a state of 
denial or withdrawal?24  In their analysis of the apocalyptic “flood myth” in the global warming 
feature film The Day After Tomorrow, Michael Salvador and Todd Norton argue that the 
apocalyptic appeal can do either or both, depending on how it is framed:  “Contemporary 
apocalyptic and jeremiad discourses of humans-in-nature manifest a palpable dialectic that 
sustains human agency as both subject to the power of nature and effectual at intervening in 
nature.”25 Yet, these authors argue, that dialectic can be dissolved, emphasizing agency or not, 
depending on the framing of the appeal.   
The framing of apocalyptic discourse has been taken up most thoroughly by Foust and 
Murphy. Using Stephen O’Leary’s26 classification of apocalyptic discourse into Burkean frames, 
Foust and Murphy find in their examination of US press coverage of global warming both “a 
tragic apocalypse, which constitutes global warming as a matter of cosmic Fate; and a comic 
apocalypse, which suggests that mistaken humans have a capacity to influence (within limits) the 
end of the global warming narrative.”27 They contend that the tragic approach forces readers to 
choose sides between the global warming naysayers and the apocalyptical environmentalists, 
concluding that it is “untenable as a rhetorical strategy for encouraging the public to become 
active participants in climate change mitigation.”28 They offer the comic apocalyptic frame as a 
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potential solution to the dilemma of human agency. “The comic frame promotes humanity as 
mistaken, rather than evil. . . .  To the extent that humanity is mistaken, it has agency for making 
different choices which may lead to different outcomes. . . .  Humanity is less likely to be 
resigned to its fate, and, as such, may be inspired to take steps to change.”29 
In the following sections, we expand this discussion of apocalyptic rhetoric in two 
significant ways.  First, we extend the application of Burkean frames to apocalyptic rhetoric by 
defining a burlesque variant of that discourse. Second, we analyze an industrial version of 
apocalyptic rhetoric, describing its central features and explaining how it functions dialectically 
to counter and weaken environmental claims.   
 
The Burlesque Frame 
Rhetorical analyses of the burlesque frame proceed from Kenneth Burke’s designation of 
burlesque as a frame of rejection in which an advocate ridicules opponents mercilessly and 
“deliberately suppresses any consideration of the ‘mitigating circumstances’ that would put his 
subject in a better light.”30 As Mark Moore maintains, “The burlesque frame, with polemical 
style, conveys attitudes of superiority and rejection from a narrow perspective designed primarily 
for caricature and debunking. … The burlesque frame of reference divides controversial issues 
and problems into what Burke describes as black-and-white, all-or-nothing schemas, hence the 
emphasis on polemic.”31 Burlesque depicts the scene in terms of “an environment of gross and 
categorical violation of traditional principles;”32 it seizes on the external actions of opponents 
and “drive[s] them to absurd extremes;”33 and it “invites not sympathy but scoffing dismissal” of 
those opponents.34 A. Cheree Carlson concurs that in the burlesque frame there is no possibility 
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for identification with the object of ridicule, since doing so would only tarnish the virtue of the 
audience.35  
The burlesque frame has been identified in diverse forms of environmental rhetoric, 
including public controversies over natural resource management, political cartoons, and 
television shows.36 However, no studies have explicitly linked burlesque to apocalyptic rhetoric; 
Moore only implicitly connects burlesque to apocalyptic when he explains that the rights-based, 
all-or-nothing burlesque rhetoric of water wars in the Western United States has resulted in “a 
doomsday discourse of rights lost by a particular group.”37 A similar pattern can be observed in 
the rhetoric of the coal industry, revealing how the extremes of the burlesque frame can lend 
themselves to the elaboration of an apocalyptic narrative.   
We use the scholarship on burlesque to identify a form of apocalyptic rhetoric that differs 
from the comic and tragic apocalyptic frames described by Foust and Murphy, and to explain the 
functions and implications of that rhetoric as it is employed by the coal industry to naturalize 
neoliberal ideology and thwart environmental regulation. First, we observe that the burlesque 
frame retains capacity for human agency in contrast to the tragic frame; however, that action is 
one of rejection. Chris Smith and Ben Voth compare the comic and burlesque frames in this way: 
“Action in the comic frame provides a platform to confront and correct problems while 
simultaneously laughing at faults instead of persecuting individuals for wrongs committed.... 
When acceptance of the ‘comic fool’ does not occur, the emphasis shifts to rejection and the 
dramaturgical frame becomes burlesque.”38 Likewise, Edward Appel places burlesque on a 
continuum halfway between comic-reformist rhetoric at one pole and tragedy at the other pole. 
“Instead of the crimes and evils of tragedy or the mere mistakes and impediments of comedy, the 
scene in burlesque is fraught with gross violations of revered, traditional principles of life and 
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action.”39 In turn, burlesque typically promotes a limited form of scapegoating of one’s 
adversaries, advocating exclusion from the public sphere rather than complete tragic 
destruction.40 Burlesque thus offers a form of agency in response to apocalyptic conditions, but 
one that looks quite different from the more charitable comic corrective championed by Foust 
and Murphy. 
Moreover, burlesque allows us to further elaborate the particular character of the coal 
industry’s anti-environmental rhetoric and its resonances with contemporary conservatism and a 
broader neoliberal ideology. It is notable that Appel explains burlesque in relation to two titans 
of conservatism in the United States, William F. Buckley and Rush Limbaugh. He claims that the 
polemical caricature and scapegoating of burlesque rhetoric leads to a redemptive vision rooted 
in narrow, sectarian, “cynical self-interest.”41 Indeed, Appel’s study of Limbaugh concludes by 
explaining how the talk show host’s distinctive rhetoric, a “burlesque tinged with tragedy,” was a 
fitting rhetorical articulation within the context and purposes of the conservative movement’s 
ascendancy in the mid 1990s—specifically, “free-market economics, low taxes, and repeal of all 
repressive federal laws that stood in the way of personal enterprise and aggrandizement.”42 These 
are precisely the issues that have animated the neoliberal ideology undergirding US conservatism 
since the mid-1970s. In Robert J. Antonio and Robert J. Brulle’s account, neoliberalism is 
grounded in a free-market ideology that calls for “deregulation, privatization, welfare cuts, and 
reduced taxation to revive high corporate profits and economic growth.”43 Moreover, they claim 
that neoliberalism gained political traction with Reagan’s appointment of James Watt and that 
“anti-environmentalism has been, from the start, a keystone of neoliberal antiregulatory 
politics.”44 Thus, it is important to observe how the burlesque frame helps to sustain that 
ideology and its particular form of anti-environmentalism. 
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Coal: An Industry Under Pressure 
We focus on the coal industry for a number of reasons.  First, for decades coal has 
dominated electricity production in the United States, providing half of electricity consumed.  In 
the spring of 2012 that total share dropped to below 40% for the first time and may continue 
falling.45 The industry is under pressure from several directions—environmental regulation due 
to climate change, negative public opinion over the practice of mountaintop removal mining, the 
growing concern over coal-fired power plants, and, perhaps most notably, market competition 
from natural gas.  The coal industry unquestionably sees itself, or at least has represented itself, 
as facing catastrophe.46 Second, the rhetorical choices the industry makes in response to these 
conditions are a significant contributor to the discourse of economic crisis that has been 
circulating since 2008.  These choices are telling in terms of the industry’s ideology, its 
understanding of its audience, and how it views its relationship to local communities and the 
national economy.  Third, we cannot ignore the financial resources of energy companies and how 
that enhances the circulation of their rhetoric.  For example, the New York Times calculated that 
two months before the 2012 presidential election, “estimated spending on television ads 
promoting coal and more oil and gas drilling or criticizing clean energy [had] exceeded $153 
million” for “138 ads on energy issues broadcast . . . by the presidential campaigns, political 
parties, energy companies, trade associations and third-party spenders.”47 The coal mining 
industry made $13.4 million in federal campaign contributions during the 2012 election cycle 
and since 2010 has averaged $18 million in spending on corporate lobbying.48  Finally, and most 
significant for this project, aside from a few studies of major oil companies like Exxon49 and 
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BP,50 little research in rhetorical studies has examined public discourse surrounding conventional 
energy extraction, making it an important area of study for the discipline. 
In order to understand the rhetorical dynamics of apocalyptic narrative and the burlesque 
frame, we gathered coal advertisements and other industry-supporting texts, including 
Greenpeace’s archive of coal ads from 1921 to 201251 and videos and print ads from two 
industry-supported campaigns, the FACES (Federation for American Coal, Energy and Security) 
of Coal and America’s Power.52  In order to examine the widespread use of the burlesque 
apocalyptic frame, we also collected popular press and op-ed pieces produced by allied 
organizations and think tanks that support the coal industry. We then compared and contrasted 
the environmental apocalyptic appeals found by Foust and Murphy to the industrial apocalyptic 
appeals found in the coal texts.  This approach allowed us to focus on defining and delineating 
the structure and function of industrial apocalyptic rhetoric. 
 
Killing Coal 
Even a cursory glance at the advertisements and promotional materials of the coal 
industry makes it clear that the industry views the United States in general, and the coal mining 
regions in particular, as imperiled.  The sonorous voice narrating one FACES television 
advertisement intones:  “Coal provides nearly 50% of our nation’s electricity and keeps our 
electricity affordable.  But now coal is threatened by EPA regulations that would shut off access 
to American coal, put tens of thousands of Americans out of work, and could cause electric rates 
to triple.  Keep the lights on.”53 The fundamental premise of this argument is that regulations not 
only threaten the coal industry but also put America on the brink of energy and economic ruin:  
the industrial apocalypse. 
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An ad from the FACES of coal website provides a more detailed version of this 
apocalyptic scenario.  The header, constructed to look like a green road sign one might see 
crossing a state border, reads: “Welcome to West Virginia!”  In caution-yellow font written 
diagonally across the welcome are the words, “A federal no-job zone by the order of the 
Environmental Protection Agency.”  The text below reads, “America’s jobless rate is stuck at 
10%, yet unelected bureaucrats in our own federal government are making things worse!  The 
U.S. EPA’s latest attack on coal mining threatens to make economic dead zones of vast areas of 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Ohio.  It may wipe out 
thousands of jobs in Appalachia—potentially yours.”  Billboards supplementing the campaign 
show the six states highlighted in red with a large banner of the same color that reads “Obama’s 
NO JOB ZONE.”  The yard signs, also in red and black, proclaim: “STOP the WAR on COAL.  
FIRE OBAMA.”   
We found a consistent combination of apocalyptic narrative and the burlesque frame in 
the texts we analyzed.  This rhetoric establishes that: 
• There is an imminent disaster (economic dead zone, American failure, control of the 
United States by foreign governments, destruction of the economy, loss of liberty, 
coming tyranny). 
• There is an entity to blame for the disaster (federal government, the EPA, unelected 
bureaucrats, Obama, environmental movement). 
• The entity is illogical, inept, hypocritical, devious, and malicious. 
• The entity is beyond redemption and therefore must be opposed or removed.  
• The audience is in no way responsible for the impending disaster. 
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These elements receive an even more hyperbolic treatment in an ad from the organization 
Kansans for Affordable Energy.54 Under prominent headshots of Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, 
and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the red-lettered title asks “Why are These Men Smiling?” The 
answer reads: “Because the recent decision by the Sebelius administration [Kathleen Sebelius, 
then-Governor of Kansas] means that Kansas will import more natural gas from countries like 
Russia, Venezuela, and Iran.”  The organization then claims that this action will cause higher 
electric bills, lost economic activity, and reduced energy security, thus allowing “hostile foreign 
countries to control the energy policy of Kansas and America.”  The solution is to call the 
Kansas House of Representatives, letting them know that the “state’s electricity must come from 
clean, affordable, reliable coal—America’s energy future.”  The ad was published in response to 
Kansas Department of Health and Environment Secretary Rod Bremby denying air-quality 
permits necessary for an existing coal fire power plant to expand.  In his decision, Bremby cited 
“the ever-increasing environmental risks associated with the emitted carbon dioxide.”55  Sebelius 
upheld the decision.56   
  The advertisement sets up an apocalyptic vision of a nation whose economy and energy 
are controlled by its political enemies.  The cause of this dire situation is not widespread reliance 
on fossil fuels or high levels of individual consumption, but the decision made by Governor 
Sebelius’s administration.  Her capacity to make decisions is presented as flawed to the point that 
her actions solely benefit America’s enemies and put the nation at risk. The organization does 
not encourage the viewer to contact Sebelius, but other (seemingly more reasonable) state 
legislators—Sebelius is symbolically cast out. The ad clearly illustrates the burlesque frame as it 
presents a simplified and polarized argument crafted for easy dismissal. Sebelius is stripped of 
her title and position.  She and her administration are characterized solely in pejorative terms.  
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The text implies rejection in that no attempt is made to understand her reasoning or negotiate 
with her administration.  She is defective beyond repair. 
 Industry campaigns are not the only examples of this rhetorical form.  We found 
conservative pundits, talk radio hosts, and authors of popular non-fiction texts also supporting 
industry using apocalyptic rhetoric in a burlesque frame. Recent books by conservative 
syndicated radio hosts Mark Levin (Liberty and Tyranny, 2009) and Brian Sussman (Eco-
Tyranny: How the Left’s Green Agenda Will Dismantle America, 2012) provide prime examples 
of industrial apocalyptic.57 These most recent examples of industrial apocalypse link traditional 
anti-environmental arguments about the economic disasters that will result from environmental 
policies and regulations to contemporary iterations of threats to individual liberty and impending 
tyranny that will result from environmental regulations.  In doing so, they represent a 
rearticulation of the secular apocalyptic that Ritter and Henry associate with Ronald Reagan, and 
illustrate the way in which contemporary versions of the industrial apocalyptic are attempting to 
manage ideological tensions.58 Consider, for example, Levin’s description of the impact of a 
“cap and trade” policy to curb the impacts of global warming:   
The coming invasion of the home and the workplace, the restriction of individual liberty, 
independence, and mobility, and the deconstruction of America’s economic system and 
impoverishing of the citizenry are justified in the name of a long and growing roster of 
preposterous assertions [about the impact of global warming]. 59  
This argumentative strategy couples climate change denial rhetoric with neoliberal concerns 
about “big government,” the destruction of the free market system, and the loss of individual 
freedom.  All are combined into an apocalyptic vision of the future.  Environmental advocates, 
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especially climate change advocates, are labeled and demonized as “alarmists,” “statists,” or 
“enviro-statists.”  They are not simply mistaken, but malicious and callous.    
 A common feature of these industrial apocalyptics is the re-telling of the historical 
narrative and implications of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, a canonical environmental text that 
raised awareness in the United States of the threat of pesticides for human and environmental 
health.   In Levin’s retelling, Carson, “the EPA and its environmental group masters conspired in 
a deliberate and systematic distortion of science, leading to genocide-like numbers of deaths of 
human beings throughout the underdeveloped world.”60 DDT is praised as a “wonder chemical” 
that protected American soldiers from malaria, and is now maliciously withheld from people in 
the “undeveloped world.”  Environmentalists are assigned tyrannical power, and associated with 
genocide. The burlesque apocalyptic framing of environmentalists could not be clearer—if they 
are responsible for genocide, then they are beyond redemption.   
 This attempt to revive the controversy associated with Carson’s Silent Spring represents 
a return to the apocalyptic roots of anti-environmental rhetoric in Monsanto’s The Desolate Year. 
The resonances between the latter text and contemporary industrial apocalyptic rhetoric are 
numerous. As in The Desolate Year, contemporary opponents of environmentalism generate 
apocalyptic visions of economic collapse, as environmentalist policies create “dead zones” and 
resource constraints that set prices spiraling out of control. Likewise, there are allusions to “the 
looming threat of some insidious other lurking beyond U.S. borders” who threatens 
sovereignty.61 Finally, The Desolate Year’s narrative ends by posing a question that articulates 
apocalyptic anxieties in nationalist terms similar to those in Levin’s and Sussman’s books: 
“What, at the end of such a year, would be the fate of the United States of America?”62  
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However, the contemporary version of industrial apocalyptic deviates from The Desolate 
Year in at least one important respect: its explicit identification and strident characterization of 
environmentalists and regulators as blameworthy entities. In The Desolate Year, environmental 
and public health regulation still have a role; the Food and Drug Administration and Department 
of Agriculture are simply prevented from doing their job effectively without the needed tool of 
pesticides.63 But more recent instances of industrial apocalyptic are animated by a full-throated 
attack on the environmental-regulatory complex, pushing this rhetoric more fully into a 
burlesque frame. As such, this anti-regulatory attack is also an attack on the environmental 
progress of the twentieth century; that progress and the broader environmental agenda is recast as 
a threat to the free market and the values that support it.  Consequently, we interpret the 
resonances between coal industry ads and conservative punditry as emblematic of a broader 
neoliberal ideology.  
 
Wanting America To Fail 
An exemplary instance of industrial apocalyptic that reinforces neoliberalism is the five-
minute video “If I Wanted America to Fail” that was posted on both the FACES and Friends of 
Coal (a related industry front group) websites during the spring of 2012. The video was 
originally produced by Free Market America, a public relations campaign supported by 
Americans for Limited Government, a nonprofit group that supports and organizes state ballot 
initiatives that are strongly neoliberal and anti-regulatory.64 The video features a charismatic 
actor filmed against a black background, eloquently moving through a series of talking points, 
speaking directly to the camera.  Suspenseful and cinematic instrumental music plays in the 
background. His face is lit by a high key light, and the talking points are strung together with a 
series of jump cuts, or cutaways to iconographic American images such as the Washington 
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Monument, the American flag, and medium shots of working- and middle-class Americans.  But 
the video also features images that represent industrialized American society: extraction 
machinery, sleek airports, and city streets.   
The talking points are just that—a string of statements that obliquely reference actual 
events but are not logically or explicitly connected to one another. Rather than offer an internally 
coherent argument, they signal the viewer to particular ideological platforms and hot-button 
controversies (such as the spotted owl conflict in the American Northwest) and link them 
together only through the repeated refrain of “If I wanted America to fail.”  The video opens with 
this depiction: 
If I wanted America to fail … I would start with energy.  I’d cut off America’s supply of 
cheap, abundant energy.  I couldn’t take it by force.  So, I’d make Americans feel guilty 
for using the energy that heats their homes, fuels their cars, runs their businesses, and 
powers their economy. I’d make cheap energy expensive, so that expensive energy would 
seem cheap. I would empower unelected bureaucrats to all-but-outlaw America’s most 
abundant sources of energy.  And after banning its use in America, I’d make it illegal for 
American companies to ship it overseas. 
As the speaker vilifies the “unelected bureaucrats,” we see images of a pencil scribbling across a 
page, and then the camera pans over stacks of books, perhaps meant to symbolize the 
intellectual, elitist left.  Although the entire video seems to be ideologically aligned with the 
rhetoric of the coal industry, it is this point about regulation that makes the video so appealing to 
the coal lobby, whose primary political and economic concern is the regulation of carbon 
emissions.  The “America Fail” video amplifies these concerns, suggesting that such regulation 
is part of an unpatriotic scheme to take down the country.  The metonymic twinning of “coal” 
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and “America” is the coal industry’s most frequent and powerful rhetorical move, and one that 
fits the burlesque frame perfectly: any attempt by bureaucrats to regulate coal must be seen as a 
threat to America. 
The repeated refrain of “If I wanted America to fail” facilitates a rhetorical strategy of 
amplification. Much like the enumeration of harms caused by pests in The Desolate Year, the 
video compiles a series of ways to make America “fail” that include teaching children about the 
global warming conspiracy, demonizing prosperity, over-regulating small business, ridiculing 
energy executives, saving spotted owls, and “fixing” free markets with schemes such as carbon 
cap and trade.  Echoing concerns about over-regulation, and again reifying the concern over 
government officials, the speaker contends, “I would empower unaccountable bureaucracies 
seated in a distant capital to bully Americans out of their dreams and their property rights.  I’d 
send federal agents to raid guitar factories for using the wrong kind of wood; I’d force 
homeowners to tear down the homes they built on their own land.”  From here the speaker makes 
explicit who is responsible for putting America at risk.  “If I wanted America to fail, I would 
transform the environmental agenda from a document of conservation to an economic suicide 
pact.  I would concede entire industries to our economic rivals by imposing regulations that cost 
trillions.”   The themes of economic catastrophe or apocalypse associated with environmental 
policy and regulation are thus reiterated. 
The speaker then elaborates on the maliciousness and depravity of those who want 
America to fail, stating, “I would celebrate those who preach environmental austerity in public, 
while indulging in lavish lifestyles in private.”  This statement illustrates supposed 
environmentalist hypocrisy and is visually accompanied by the clicking of champagne glasses 
and then by headlines that reference Al Gore and pop singer Madonna.  The speaker drives home 
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the burlesque frame by stating: “I would prey on the goodness and decency of ordinary 
Americans.  I would only need to convince them, that all of this, is for the greater good.”  In 
doing so, the video positions the audience, “ordinary Americans” as the victims of hypocritical 
environmentalists who “prey” upon them.  The speaker concludes with the words, “If I wanted 
America to fail, I suppose I wouldn’t change a thing.”  
Across all these examples, the means of avoiding the apocalypse are both explicit and 
implicit.  The explicit appeals are for the audience to call their representatives, vote, join 
organizations such as FACES or America’s Power, and/or support the coal industry.  The other, 
often implicit, solution is to remove the categorically flawed entity that has caused or 
exacerbated the oncoming apocalypse.  Unlike the comic frame in which the entity is shown to 
have a redeemable flaw, in the burlesque frame the person or organization is beyond recovery 
and thus must be removed.  Public calls to stop Obama’s reelection, for his impeachment, the 
dismantling of the EPA, or the dismissal of various elected officials, while not necessarily stated 
in each advertisement, are the logical, if extreme, response to the burlesque version of industrial 
apocalyptic.    
 
Strategic and Ideological Implications of Industrial Apocalyptic Rhetoric 
Given the ongoing rhetorical struggle over the meaning of environmental and economic 
crises, our analysis of industrial apocalyptic in the rhetoric of the coal industry provides an 
example of “how crises get rearticulated and transformed as they circulate among various 
contexts.”65 In this instance, industrial apocalyptic helps the coal industry respond to a variety of 
pressures and recast environmental regulation as the cause of economic crisis that poses a 
fundamental threat to individual liberty. In this concluding section, we use our analysis to 
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address two critical questions about industrial apocalyptic rhetoric and its influence on broader 
trends in public discourse.  First, why is there such a consistent, strong backlash to 
environmental apocalyptic rhetoric and such a muted response to the industrial apocalyptic 
rejoinder?  Even though opposing sides warn of approaching catastrophe, the industrial rejoinder 
seems to generate far less public resistance. Second, how does industrial apocalyptic rhetoric 
contribute to the hegemony of neoliberalism, which sustains existing patterns of resource 
extraction, production, and consumption? Both questions are crucial for interpreting and 
criticizing the public discourse that constitutes controversies over energy resources and 
environmental protection.  
Environmental versus Industrial Apocalyptic 
In comparing environmental apocalyptic rhetoric to its industrial counterpart, 
environmental apocalyptic rhetoric asks more of its audience. It constructs a problem that is not 
isolated or contained; it affects everyone and calls into question each aspect of a person’s life.  
As a result, the apocalyptic rhetoric used by environmentalists often calls for a “fully radical 
transformation of society”66 and a fundamental ideological shift.67   It takes control of the 
problem out of human hands (tragic frame) or lessens the human agency to stop the apocalypse 
(comic frame).68  Environmental apocalyptic rhetoric implies difficult fixes—systemic and 
expensive changes to infrastructures and cultures, and its speakers get chided when they provide 
solutions that do not seem to match the magnitude of the problem, such as changing a light bulb. 
In contrast, industrial apocalyptic rhetoric asks less of the audience: it merely encourages 
its audience to support the countermovement, join an organization, or vote.  It constructs a 
problem that is significant but contained; it is regional, organizational, individual or industry-
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specific.  Like other instances of secular apocalyptic rhetoric, industrial apocalyptic “treats 
historical events as contingent on human action;”69 it puts both the problem and solution squarely 
in human hands. Moreover, it provides quick fixes, offering small changes via a comic frame or 
calling for removal of the offending entity through the burlesque.  
The shift in human agency may be one of the reasons that the response to the 
environmental apocalyptic rhetoric varies so dramatically from the industrial. Environmental 
rhetoric often frames the apocalypse as unintended: individual decisions about the chemicals 
people put on their lawns, the modes of transportation they use, and the number of children they 
will have contribute to an impending disaster that no one person has caused, yet all are 
responsible for. The burlesque version of industrial apocalyptic flips this argument through the 
use of a scapegoat, thus absolving the audience of any responsibility for imminent catastrophe. 
This scapegoat is powerful, often to the point of tyranny. Whereas environmentalists place 
individual decision making at the root of the apocalypse, the industrial rejoinder claims that the 
true catastrophe is over-regulation of individual decisions, which poses a fundamental threat to 
the free market.  The focus on an all-controlling tyrant absolves the audience of any personal 
guilt for the problem, thereby removing the impetus to lash out at the rhetor.  Instead, they are 
called upon to funnel their anger toward a scapegoat in order to again regain control of their 
lives. Following the logic of the burlesque frame, the scapegoat must then be rejected.   
This explanation of why industrial apocalyptic rhetoric finds easier public acceptance 
must also take into consideration how the burlesque frame promotes broader ideological goals.  
Moore explains the scapegoating dynamics of burlesque by arguing that “This act of rejection 
also implies some corresponding acceptance of something else, thus the tendency toward 
extreme partisanship.”70  But what, exactly, does apocalyptic rhetoric ask its audience to accept? 
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The answer is often vague.  For environmentalists, ambiguity about goals leaves them vulnerable 
to charges that they are idealistic, lacking a clear vision of the future and a practical blueprint for 
getting there.71  In contrast, for industry, burlesque apocalyptic functions as a negative method of 
promoting acceptance of the status quo. By casting blame on a caricatured environmentalist 
position and then offering rejection of that position as the preferred solution, the coal industry 
can deflect sustained critical attention to the environmental consequences of extracting and 
burning coal. Instead of a “radical transformation of society,” industrial apocalyptic calls for the 
buttressing of traditional free-market principles.  
 
Industrial Apocalyptic, Burlesque, and Neoliberalism 
Three of the rhetorical elements of burlesque described previously illustrate how 
industrial apocalyptic amplifies and normalizes neoliberal ideals. First, burlesque depicts the 
scene of action as “an environment of gross and categorical violation of traditional principles.”72   
Second, it “drives external actions of opponents to absurd extremes.”73 Third, it “invites not 
sympathy but scoffing dismissal.”74 By exploring the way that the coal industry’s rhetoric 
integrates these moves with the apocalyptic narrative form, we can see how neoliberal ideals are 
amplified and normalized by industrial apocalyptic. 
First, neoliberal ideology is articulated through burlesque by framing the scene as a gross 
and categorical violation of traditional free-market principles. Each of the texts we analyze 
emphasizes ideographs such as <liberty>, <free markets>, and <private property>. The 
identification of traditional principles grounds the industrial apocalyptic narratives in neoliberal 
ideology.  Further, identifying and focusing on the counterpoints, or threats to these traditional 
principles—“environmental regulation," "unelected bureaucrats," “environmentalists”—reframes 
environmental concerns and other pressures on industry as evidence of a threat to cherished 
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economic and cultural principles that undergird neoliberalism. In addition, the Kansans for 
Affordable Energy ad emphasizes the ideograph of <security> as it raises the specter of “hostile 
foreign countries” trying to control US energy policy, articulating a link between neoliberal 
economic ideology and neoconservative national security rhetoric. Market regulation not only 
infringes on individual liberty, it also puts national sovereignty at risk.  
 Second, as the coal industry uses the burlesque to caricature opponents and their actions 
by pushing them to absurd extremes, it deflects attention from neoliberal practices and allows 
those practices to escape critical scrutiny. For example, the ad that focuses on a “no job zone” 
shifts emphasis away from corporate profits to unemployed individuals, and attributes 
unemployment to the “war on coal” launched by Obama and “unelected bureaucrats.” This 
buttresses the neoliberal ideology by implicitly defining individuals as reliant on industry and by 
providing the industry with a scapegoat that shifts responsibility for unemployment away from 
production-side measures utilized to increased corporate efficiency (such as mountaintop 
removal mining and increased mechanization), and market competition from other energy 
sources such as natural gas.  
Third, the scoffing dismissal of burlesque is ultimately a reactionary rhetoric designed to 
thwart progressive challenges to the neoliberal status quo.  Consider the last line of the “If I 
wanted American Fail” video: "If I wanted America to fail, I suppose I wouldn't change a thing." 
Here we see the “appearance” of a call for radical change, a sort of call to arms to resist and rebel 
against a caricatured foe—environmentalists and government agencies. With this move the coal 
industry attempts to hold back a challenge to their hegemony by reversing the roles traditionally 
played in environmental controversies75—environmentalists are cast as all-powerful tyrants of 
the establishment, the coal industry as a rebellious, persecuted underdog.  The ideographs in play 
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are familiar neoliberal fare (liberty, freedom, private property) and are designed to tap into the 
spirit of American rebellion and revolution.  In short, the burlesque apocalyptic becomes an 
expansive rhetoric (from “no job zone” to American Failure) that goes on the offensive to resist 
change. 
Further, the industrial apocalyptic as deployed by the coal industry illustrates the 
complexity of contemporary rhetorics of reaction.  Albert O. Hirschman, in his classic study, 
identifies three argumentative forms associated with the rhetoric of reaction—the perversity 
thesis, the futility thesis, and the jeopardy thesis.76 The industrial apocalyptic presents a 
sophisticated variant of the jeopardy thesis, in which proposed progressive reforms are 
constituted as a threat to previously hard-won gains associated with liberty and economic 
security.  For the jeopardy thesis to be effective, Hirschman argues, “there must exist the living 
memory of the highly prized earlier victory.”77 And yet, living memories are rhetorically 
produced.  By building narratives that articulate gross violations of traditional principles, provide 
scapegoats for declining economic conditions, and offer rebellion against environmental tyrants, 
the industrial apocalyptic does the rhetorical work needed to produce the living memory that 
enables the rhetorical form.   
 The apocalyptic narrative form brings together all these elements of reaction in a 
burlesque form as it shapes an audience’s understanding of past, present and future.78 This 
seamless narrative depicts an ideal past of full employment in which historic conflicts between 
labor and industry are ignored; a present in which scapegoats are responsible for declining 
production and increasing unemployment; and a future in which imagined economic catastrophe 
and tyranny will prove the claims of the coal industry once and for all.79  Indeed, the coal 
industry is able to use cost cutting strategies, such as laying-off workers, to “prove” that this 
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future is in fact a reality.80  However, the backward-looking call for restoration of traditional 
free-market principles is a temporal shift that enables this rhetoric to avoid the apocalyptic label. 
Thus, by taking advantage of the apocalyptic narrative form the coal industry is able to amplify 
its burlesque frame and hide its apocalyptic claims in plain sight.  
The apocalyptic rhetoric and the burlesque framing deployed by the coal industry also 
enable the industrial position to be seen as the common-sense discourse of the center. As Star 
Muir explains, the very assertion that environmentalists engage in apocalyptic rhetoric and the 
absence of a countervailing label for similar industry rhetoric does the rhetorical work of 
positioning environmentalism as extreme and its proposed solutions as hopelessly utopian.81  
Moreover, as Hays suggests, labeling environmentalists as doomsayers elides the optimism that 
comes with the belief that environmental problems can be identified and solved, and deflects 
attention from the inherent pessimism of industrial apocalyptic discourse, which asserts that any 
attempt at addressing environmental problems will lead to certain economic decline and job 
loss.82  That pessimism is reconstituted as commonsensical and realistic.   
Our analysis extends Hays’s insight by developing the ideological implications of these 
rhetorical strategies; in particular, that industrial apocalyptic in a burlesque frame provides a 
rhetorical form that is well suited to normalizing neoliberalism as common sense. It is effective 
for two main reasons.  First, liberalism, and by extension neoliberalism, are ideologies that are 
often articulated through a burlesque frame. As Burke notes, “The method of burlesque (polemic, 
caricature) is partial not only in the sense of partisan, but also in the sense of incompleteness.”83   
Liberalism, according to Burke, offers rights, but denies obligations.  It defends liberty and 
private property in absolutist terms, and ignores corresponding and complementary duties to 
society and the common good, which, in turn, would “require us to stress the ambivalence of 
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rights and obligations.”84 For Burke, “the very basis of classic liberal apologetics, the over-
emphasis upon freedom, was but a sober way of carrying out the burlesque genius.”85   
Neoliberalism, like liberalism, utilizes this same kind of over-emphasis on freedom to craft an 
extreme and polemic ideology that identifies individual liberty with private property and market 
rationality.  
The use of the burlesque frame masks the apocalyptic character of the industrial 
narrative. The frame helps manage the tension between the apocalyptic narrative’s implied call 
for radical rebellion and the neoliberal goal of restoring traditional free-market principles 
According to Killingsworth and Palmer, apocalyptic narrative “is an expansive and offensive 
rhetorical strategy.”86 It goes on the offensive by implying “the need for radical change,” by 
marking “oneself as an outsider,” risking “alienation,” and urging “others into the open air of 
rebellion.”86 By deploying apocalyptic narratives, the coal industry is able to go on the offensive, 
position itself as a radical outsider, and call for rebellion against a caricatured opponent.   
But in combination with the burlesque frame, industrial apocalyptic turns away from calls 
for radical social or ideological change and thus avoids risking alienation. In this sense, industrial 
apocalyptic is a new twist on the strategy of aggressive mimicry that Jennifer Peeples observed 
in the rhetoric of the Wise Use Movement,88 in which pro-industry organizations employed the 
anti-establishment identity and discourse of environmental groups in order to force 
environmentalists to use limited resources to defend themselves against the characterization that 
they were government insiders focused solely on special interests. In this case, the coal industry 
co-opts the apocalyptic language and appeals of environmentalists, but then uses a burlesque 
frame to position those who produce and benefit from an entrenched neoliberal ideology as 
radical outsiders being attacked by powerful and dominant foes. Just as Tea Party rhetors 
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position themselves as radical outsiders, even while they defend the most basic and traditional 
liberal principles (individualism, liberty, private property), so too is the coal industry able to 
position itself as a radical agent of social change, even while it works to prevent social change.   
The appearance of burlesque in industrial apocalyptic, its degree of intensity, and its 
potential shading into tragedy89 all may serve as indexes of neoliberal ideology, and point toward 
sites where neoliberalism’s footing is not yet secure. In other words, industrial apocalyptic marks 
key moments of the ideological suturing of neoliberalism’s contradictions. The burlesque frame 
is just one rhetorical tactic for pursuing this work. The exaggerated, absurd extremes of industry 
rhetoric analyzed in this essay mark an aggressive mode of neoliberal rhetoric, whereas the 
rhetoric of coal front groups that makes support for coal inherent to regional cultural values or 
national identity reveals its more positive, celebratory mode. Ultimately, industrial apocalyptic 
rhetoric attempts to clear the rhetorical field of competing voices and naturalize neoliberal 
ideology as the commonsense way of approaching environmental and economic crises.    
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